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This paper analyses whether scale economies exists in the UK
telecommunications industry.  The approach employed differs from other UK
studies in that panel data for a range of companies is used.  This increases the
number of observations and thus allows potentially for more robust tests for
global subadditivity of the cost function.  The main findings from the study
reveal that although the results need to be treated with some caution
allowing/encouraging infrastructure competition in the local loop may result in
substantial cost savings.
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1.  Introduction
The UK has historically pursued a policy of infrastructure or local loop
competition in the telecommunications market with the aim of delivering
dynamic competition, the key focus of which is innovation.  Recently,
however, Directives from Europe have been issued which could be argued
discourages competition in the local loop.  The Commission’s starting point
appears to be that the local loop is a natural monopoly and so competition in
the local loop harms efficiency by duplicating fixed costs resulting in a reduced
exploitation of economies of scale and scope.  This belief has to be scrutinised
in some detail, as it is fundamental to the question of whether regulation or
competition should prevail for the provision of telecommunications networks.
And to-date, this has not been adequately analysed for the UK.
Using panel data for UK infrastructure providers and techniques previously not
used in the UK literature, we try to examine the extent to which the overall
cost function of the U.K. telecommunications industry is subadditive and
examine whether joint production or economies of scale and scope characterise
the industry.  The main finding from the study reveals that despite
qualifications as to the reliability of the estimated cost function, which may
make us cautious in any inference, allowing/encouraging infrastructure
competition in the local loop may result in cost savings.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a brief
outline of the main studies investigating scale and scope economies in
telecommunications.  Section 3 describes the cost modelling methodology
adopted in this paper.  Section 4 is dedicated to data discussion pertaining to the
above analysis.  Section 5 then presents the estimation results of the cost
function of the UK telecommunications sector.  Section 6 focuses on ourNatural or Unnatural Monopolies in U.K. Telecommunications?
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subadditivity tests and presents the results emanating from these tests.  Finally,
Section 7 concludes the paper.
2.  Previous Related Research
The question of whether a telecommunications system and specifically the local
loop of the system is a natural monopoly has been studied extensively.  Most of
the studies, in the literature have however been based on time-series data of the
main incumbent operator.  Furthermore, most of them have focused, due to
the availability of data, on just the U.S. or Canadian telecommunications
sector.
The earlier studies (see Dobell, Taylor, Waverman, Lin and Copeland - 1972,
Vinod –1972, and Sudit – 1973) involved estimation of single output functions.
And for the most part, the reported results were generally consistent and
suggested significant economies of scale.  Fuss and Waverman (1981) recognised
however that cost or production functions based on an aggregate measure of
output are valid only under highly restrictive assumptions.  Given this, they
developed a multiple output, multiple input model from which they derived a
translog cost function.  Using Bell Canada data from 1952 to 1975, the authors
rejected the hypothesis of an aggregate measure of output i.e. separability of the
transformation function, and found weak evidence of cost complementarity
between local and toll services and between the toll service and the private line.
The derived estimates of scale elasticity appeared, however, to be ambiguous as
they rose from less than one in the early years to greater than one in the later
years.  Fuss and Waverman (1981) therefore commented that there was no
strong evidence to support subadditivity.  They added, however, that perhaps
this was the case because their test was not suitable or reliable as it involved the
extrapolation of the cost function far outside the sample in order to calculate
stand-alone costs for local, toll and private line services.Natural or Unnatural Monopolies in U.K. Telecommunications?
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In a similar way to the above, Evans and Heckman (1983, 1984, 1986) rejected
the single-output specification of the cost function.  Instead, they estimated a
multiproduct cost function using data developed by Christensen, Cummings
and Schoech (1983) and output data generated by dividing output revenues by
the average price of local and toll services.  Using time-series data for 1947 – 77,
they applied a local test of subadditivity, which constrained the output region
to that of the available data.  The result of this was that they rejected the
natural monopoly hypothesis for local and long distance calls for the period
1958 – 77.  Charnes, Cooper and Sueyoshi (1988), however, supposedly using
the same data as Evans and Heckman (1983, 1984, 1986) modified their test and
utilised goal programming or constrained regression analysis.  The result of this
was that their approach yielded the opposite result to the Evans and Heckman
model.  In response, Evans and Heckman (1988) argued that there was no basis
for comparison between their approach and the Charnes et al. (1988) approach
as the functional form as well as the data were not identical for the two models.
Additionally, they argued that if the same data and functional forms had been
used, the results would have been similar to their study and thus the inference
about the natural monopoly hypothesis would have been unchanged.
In 1990, Röller further modified the Evans and Heckman (1983) subadditivity
test by constraining the cost function to satisfy a property termed “properness”
in order to ensure a well behaved and economically plausible cost function.
According to Röller (1990a, b), a proper cost function is defined as being
nonnegative and linearly homogeneous, concave and non-decreasing in input
prices as well as having positive marginal cost schedules.  This last property is
argued by Röller to be the most important as it ensures that ‘degenerate’
translog cost behaviour is not too excessive.  Using this concept of ‘properness’
in conjunction with the Christensen et al. (1983) data used by Evans andNatural or Unnatural Monopolies in U.K. Telecommunications?
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Heckman, Röller estimated a CES-Quadratic cost function and found that the
Evans and Heckman (1983, 1984, 1986) results were reversed and that the pre-
divestiture Bell data was actually fully consistent with a natural monopoly
1.
In the same year as Röller’s study, Hunt & Lynk (1990) in the U.K. carried out
time-series analysis for the pre-privatisation period of BT.  Their modelling
methodology, however, differed substantially from previous analysis of the
telecommunications industry in that the data extracted from the Post Office
was recognised as being strongly time trended.  As a consequence, cointegration
and error-correction model techniques were used to derive a long run cost
function.  An examination of this revealed a long-run elasticity of cost with
respect to both outputs of between 0.6 and 0.7 and a long-run multi-product
scale economy estimate of between 1.5 and 1.8.  They thus concluded that for
the period 1951 – 81, telecommunications production in the inland and
international areas was characterised by cost complementarities and that the
cost function was locally subadditive since the industry appeared to be
characterised by both economies of scale and economies of scope.  They did
not, however, explicitly test for the subadditivity of the cost function.
Therefore, their results must be interpretated with caution
2.
                                                          
1. Fuss and Waverman (2002) argue however that Röller’s model biases the
subadditivity test towards acceptance of natural monopoly via its assumptions.  In
particular, Röller’s cost function model “assumes that a stand-alone producer of
toll services has the identical dollar amount of fixed costs as a firm that produces
both toll and local services.  Also Röller’s model assumes that any cost
complementarity savings associated with the interconnected nature of toll and
local service facilities is lost with respect to the competitor’s provision of toll.”
Conducting some analysis on the Röller model, the authors found that the “fixed
cost requirement is not very stringent” and hence they concluded that “the Röller
model does not provide evidence against competitive entry.”
2. Furthermore, it should be noted that the local nature of their test means that it
could never confirm the natural monopoly hypothesis, only reject it.  No real
inference can therefore be made from their results as to whether or not a natural
monopoly characterises BT.Natural or Unnatural Monopolies in U.K. Telecommunications?
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Whilst the studies above using various statistical regression techniques have all
contributed to the literature analysing whether telecommunications is a natural
monopoly, the empirical results have not been consistent and the analysis
conducted is subject to several important limitations.  A major problem with
previous studies has been the fact that most have relied on single company
aggregate time-series data, for the most part using only 30 yearly observations
on costs, output, input prices and technological change.  It is therefore probable
that most of the results obtained, will suffer from a lack of sufficient degrees of
freedom and from data that is highly time trended.  A further problem with
previous studies is that the choice of data for the output variables has usually
relied on output revenues.  The fact that most costs incurred and revenues
received by the various entities that provide telecommunications services are
determined by the “separation and settlement” process means that there is
much scope for the correspondence between reported costs and revenues and
economic costs and revenues for the individual entities/business operations to
be disjointed thus leading to inaccurate output measures
3.
To resolve a lot of the problems/limitations outlined above, Shin and Ying
(1992) examined, therefore, the subadditivity of local exchange carriers (LECs)
in the U.S. by using data consisting of a pooled cross-sectional sample of 58
LECs from 1976 to 1983.  The result of this was that the small sample size
problem that characterised previous studies was no longer an issue here and in
                                                          
3. In the U.S. and to a lesser extent in the U.K., the separation and settlement process
involves periodic negotiations between the incumbent operator and the Regulator.
These negotiations assign the costs of operating the network and the revenues
earned, to the various business/network operations of the incumbent company
using specific formulas.  Given the negotiation process involved, it can therefore be
argued that the assignment formulas are determined more by a political/regulatory
process rather than an economic process.  As a consequence, there is much scope
for the correspondence between reported costs and revenues and economic costs
and revenues for the individual entities to be disjointed.Natural or Unnatural Monopolies in U.K. Telecommunications?
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fact using this data meant that there were sufficient degrees of freedom available
to obtain more precise estimates.  Shin and Ying (1992) also tried to overcome
the measurement error in the output variables by using access numbers and the
number of calls reported by firms.  The impact of this on their study was that
their range of values for the outputs had much higher variance than Evans and
Heckman’s and hence meant that the local test proposed by Evans and
Heckman (as discussed in Section 4.6) was not critical.  Estimating a translog
cost function using the additional observations and the better data described
above, Shin and Ying found that the LECs did not have a subadditive cost
function.  These results were further confirmed and enhanced when the authors
imposed Röller’s (1990a, b) concept of ‘properness’ on the cost function.  They
hence concluded that breaking up the existing LECs or allowing local exchange
competition may result in substantial cost savings.
Although Shin and Ying’s methodology offers many important advantages, it
does, however, assume that all firms – both hypothetical and actual – will use
the same technology.  In reality, a range of substitute transmission and local
telecommunications systems has emerged.  The natural monopoly test should
consequently comprise all of these networks as well.  A natural monopoly in
the telecommunications network will only therefore exist if subadditivity
prevails for the terrestrial, the satellite and mobile networks, and any
combination of these systems.
Taking the above considerations into account, this paper will therefore further
contribute to the literature in this area by firstly extending the natural
monopoly analysis in the U.K. to the post-privatisation and post-duopoly
period.  The analysis contained here utilises unbalanced panel data (instead of
time-series data) from the U.K. telecommunications sector for 29 (local)
                                                                                                                                                              Natural or Unnatural Monopolies in U.K. Telecommunications?
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infrastructure providers for the period 1990 to 1997.  This ensures that
sufficient degrees of freedom are present in the study.  The investigation also
uses, as Shin and Ying (1992) did in their paper, access line numbers and the
number of call minutes reported by firms as output variables.  In contrast,
however, to the Shin and Ying study, this paper focuses on not only same
technology firms but also on substitute telecommunications systems (15 fixed
link operators, 11 cable operators and 3 mobile systems
4).  The scope and form
of the techniques used in this analysis forms the basis of discussion of the
following sections.
3.  Econometric Estimation Of The Cost Function
To determine the appropriate structure of the U.K. telecommunications
industry, we adopt a dual approach and estimate a multiproduct cost function.
Using a comprehensive cost function representation of the form:
) , , , ( t a y w C C = (1)
where C  represents long-run total costs, w is a vector of factor prices,  y  is a
vector of outputs, a is a vector of operating characteristics and t is a
technological change indicator.  We assume that this cost function is twice-
differentiable and can be approximated by a second-order Taylor series
expansion.
Although there are many possible choices for the functional form, we adopt the
translog cost function.  It places no a priori restrictions on substitution
possibilities among the factors of productions.  Equally important, it allows
                                                          
4. In the U.K. there are four mobile systems: O2 (formerly known as Cellnet),
Vodafone, T-Mobile (formerly known as One2One) and Orange.  For the period
of analysis (1990 – 1997), O2 was part of BT and separated accounts were not
produced for this system so just 3 mobile systems were explicitly modelled.Natural or Unnatural Monopolies in U.K. Telecommunications?
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scale economies to vary with the level of output.  This feature is essential to
enable the unit cost curve to attain the classical  shape.  The function is
written as (2):
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where ε  is a disturbance term comprising two components, a remainder term
r and a random measurement error term δ .  All variables utilised in the
estimation process except  t    are deviations from their sample mean
5.
Following the steps as outlined by Berndt (1991), logarithmically differentiating
(2) with respect to the input prices and then employing Shephard’s Lemma, one
obtains cost share equations of the form:
i ti
















τ τ α α
+ +






                                                      




where  i ε is the disturbance term for the ith factor share equation.  It has two
components, a remainder term  i i w r r ∂ ∂ = and white noise  i δ .
For the cost function to be well behaved, costs must be increasing in output
and factor prices and it must be homogeneous of degree 1 in factor prices, given
y .  Imposing symmetry and homogeneity via parameter constraints, the cost
                                                          
5. The variables are deviations from their sample mean after taking logs.  Thus,
evaluated at the sample mean, second-order parameter estimates would drop out
for these variables, and the first-order coefficients would approximately equal
elasticities at the sample mean.Natural or Unnatural Monopolies in U.K. Telecommunications?
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function (2) and the factor share equations (3) are jointly estimated using
‘seemingly unrelated regression’ methods proposed by Zellner (1962).
Since the factor shares always sum to unity, to efficiently estimate the above
system of equations, one factor share equation can be removed and the price
variables in the remaining share equations can be expressed as price relatives
with the denominator being the price of the factor whose share equation has
been removed.  The parameters of the deleted equation can then be derived
through the use of the homogeneity restrictions.
Economies of scale are defined in terms of the relative increase in outputs
resulting from a proportional increase in all inputs.  Hanoch (1975) has,
however, pointed out that it is more appropriate to represent scale economies
by the relationship between total cost and output along the expansion path,
where input prices are constant and costs are minimised at every level of
output.  A natural way of expressing scale elasticity - here, called SCE as per
Christensen and Greene (1976) - is therefore the inverse of the proportional
increase in cost resulting from a small proportional increase in the level of










    where 1
CY ε ε (4)
This results in an SCE greater than one implying increasing returns to scale
whilst a SCE less than one suggests scale diseconomies.  Furthermore, SCE has
a natural interpretation in percentage terms.Natural or Unnatural Monopolies in U.K. Telecommunications?
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4.  Data
As discussed in Section 1, the aim of this paper is to investigate whether the
post-duopoly cost structure characterising U.K. telecommunications is
consistent with a natural monopoly hypothesis.  In carrying out this analysis,
we should be able to make a more informed judgement as to whether
regulation in the form of open network provision with monopoly local
networks or competition in the form of infrastructure competition should
prevail for the provision of telecommunications networks.  Given that the
U.K. policy of encouraging competing networks in the industry has been in
place since 1990/91 – the Duopoly Review - the dataset used in the current
analysis consists of an unbalanced panel of (local) infrastructure providers for
the period 1990 to 1997.  This should therefore allow us not only to analyse the
post-duopoly cost structure of U.K. telecommunications but also to consider
the U.K. model of telecommunications.
Annual company accounts were collected for the financial years 1989/90 –
1997/98, for all the U.K. fixed-link public telecommunications operators
(PTOs), cable and mobile operators, essentially all operators who had local
loop infrastructure
6.  Table 4.1 provides a data summary for the years 1990 and
1997.  It should be observed that the size of the firms varies considerably.
Consequently, substantial robustness checks have been conducted on the use of
the data in the estimation process to ensure that the firms analysed in this study
can be grouped together legitimately for the purposes of analysing the UK
industry.  A discussion of these checks is provided in the next Section.
An important advantage of using this extended dataset is that we now have
more observations to circumvent the small sample size problem that has
                                                          
6. A list of the firms analysed in this paper can be obtained from the author on
request.Natural or Unnatural Monopolies in U.K. Telecommunications?
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characterised previous studies i.e. Hunt and Lynk (1990).  This enables us to
obtain better estimates for BT.
Using the annual accounts, data on capital costs, wages and operating costs
were
1990
a Maximum 24797 57775 25438 76
Minimum 0.0175 0.0079 0.0010 0.5828
Ratio of Max/Min 1417152 7309728.4 24917325.67 130
Mean of All Firms 1990 4622 2094 12
Standard Deviation 6855 15974 7027 20
Mean of Top 4 Firms 6448 14981 6804 57
Number of Others 9 9 9 9
Mean of Other Firms 9 18 1 8
1997
b Maximum 27553 75555 40206 247
Minimum 0.0001 0.0010 0.0010 0.3854
Ratio of Max/Min 275530000 75555000 40206000 642
Mean of All Firms 1364 2955 1619 18
Standard Deviation 5103 13978 7497 52
Mean of Top 4 Firms 8759 20498 11591 171
Number of Others 25 25 25 25
Mean of Other Firms 180 149 23 6











bIn 1997, twenty-nine infrastructure providers were present in the marketplace - 11 cable operators,
15 fixed link operators and 3 mobile systems
   Table 4.1
Summary Statistics of UK Firm Data For 1990 and 1997
UK Firm Outputs
aIn 1990, thirteen infrastructure providers were present in the marketplace - 8 cable operators, 4 4
fixed link operators and 1 mobileNatural or Unnatural Monopolies in U.K. Telecommunications?
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collected.  To calculate total cost (TC), expenses for factors excluding capital
are given by operating expenses minus depreciation.  Capital expenditures were
measured by depreciation charges, interest on capital and interest on working
capital where for the latter two charges, the same cost of capital was utilised
7.
For the inputs, the price of labour (PL) is compensation per employee.  The
capital price (PK) is capital expenses divided by the average number of access
lines
8.  For the price of other factors (PO), residual expenses are divided by the
average number of access lines.  The factor shares are the corresponding
expenses over total cost (TC).
The output variables are the average number of access lines (A), local calls (LO),
other calls – comprising national and international calls (NAIN) and for the
cable operators, the number of basic TV subscribers (TV).  To take account of
the heterogeneous nature of the industry
9, the vector of operating
                                                          
7. Given that capital in telecommunications does not have constant productivity over
its life, the depreciation figures were collected from the individual company annual
accounts.  To calculate interest on capital (we used the net book value as our proxy
for capital) and on working capital (defined as current assets minus liabilities), we
utilised the real cost of capital figure used by OFTEL in setting BT’s network
charge controls.
8. Given data limitations, it is impossible to obtain capital prices.  As a consequence,
given that capital costs in telecommunications predominantly originate from
network costs, which in turn are mainly driven by access line numbers and the
usage that customers make of these lines, it appears acceptable to use capital
expenses divided by access lines, as a proxy for the price of capital.  Nonetheless, as
a check, we also estimated the translog cost function (as discussed above) assuming
that the price of capital was constant across firms.  The impact of this on the
results was negligible.  A similar check was also conducted on other prices and
again there was no significant change in the results.
9. It is reasonable to assume that firms with different systems may have different
production technologies.  Consequently, in Section 5, we first analyse the
estimated cost functions for the separate systems and then via Chow tests, we
consider whether it is possible to group the systems together into one function.  If
we are to do this, however, it is important that the heterogeneous nature of the
systems is captured.Natural or Unnatural Monopolies in U.K. Telecommunications?
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characteristics includes customer density (DEN), the percentage of exchanges
that are digital for fixed link operators (DE)
10, channel capacity for cable
operators (CAP)
11, and for mobile operators, a technology shifter to distinguish
between PCN and GSM systems (MO).  These latter three characteristics can
be viewed as proxies for quality or technology whilst the customer density
variable, which is customers or access lines per kilometre squared, indicates the
density of service.  So for example, rural areas may have lower customer
density and so would ceteris paribus be more costly to serve.
Technological change for the industry was measured using the Peterson Index
of Productivity (see Peterson – 1979, Correa - 2003).  The index was calculated
for the telecommunications industry on a year-on-year basis for 1990 to 1997
using annual input-output matrices (CSO 1998; HMSO, 1992).  The year-on-
year changes were
                                                          
10. In the total cost estimation, a check was carried out to ascertain whether the
results would change if the variable DE was included in the function as a
percentage rather than as a logarithm.  The effect was negligible, so the logarithm
approach was maintained.
11. As a proxy for quality for the cable operators, the number of cable channels (CAP)
was used.  Crandall and Furchgott-Roch (1996) found that more channels
encourage greater subscription to basic services and so reduce the overall cost to
operators in providing cable TV.  The log of the age of the system was also trialled
– as an alternative and additional variable to channel capacity.  The number of
years between the date of initial service and the year of analysis was used as the
measure of sytem age.  This variable was however not used in the final reported
cost equation because its inclusion did not significantly improve the overall fit.
Notwithstanding, there were a few significant changes in the coefficients: the
interaction term of age and the output variables showed that as the age of the
system increases, the cost for access lines and TV subscriptions decreases
significantly, the cost for local calls increases significantly and for national calls, it
weakly decreases.  These results therefore appear to weakly confirm an
observation made in the 1970s by Comanor and Mitchell (1971); Park (1972); and
Noll, Peck and McGowan (1973) that cable system subscriptions (and access lines)
may increase with the age of the system and so reduce the average cost to operators
in providing service.Natural or Unnatural Monopolies in U.K. Telecommunications?
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generally positive except for 1992/93 and 1996/97
12.
5.  Econometric Estimation Results Of The Cost Function
As mentioned, a range of substitute transmission and local telecommunications
systems has emerged.  In analysing firms with different systems and
characteristics, it is reasonable to assume that their production technologies
may differ.  Consequently, separate cost functions for these systems were
estimated (where possible) and residuals were examined by type of
infrastructure.  The results of this analysis show that the hypothesis of stability
cannot be rejected and so it appears reasonable to group the cable and fixed link
operators together into one cost function
13 14.  Given the apparent differences in
                                                          
12. The Peterson Index of Productivity was also calculated for the period 1990/97.
This showed that the efficiency effect was positive over the whole period.
Consequently, in the cost estimation, as a check, the annual average efficiency
effect from the 1990/97 Peterson Index was also used.  The results did not change
significantly.  So the annual year-on-year Peterson indices were maintained in the
dataset.
13. There are 80 observations for the cable data and 77 observations for the fixed link
operators.  Chow predictive tests and analysis of variance tests for the inclusion of
both cable and fixed link operators in a single function shows that at the 5% level
of significance, the hypothesis of stability cannot be rejected.  Additional tests for
grouping together the different fixed link operators (i.e. the group comprises
regional players – Kingston  - and small national carriers e.g. Mercury) was also
conducted.  The fixed link cost function was estimated with Kingston excluded
and a Chow predictive test was then conducted.  This showed that Kingston could
be included in the sample.  A further test was also done for Mercury.  Again, this
showed that stability could not be rejected and so this player could be included in
the sample.
14. For the fixed operators in the combined dataset, TV output was set at 0.00001.  As
a check, however, we also applied 1% of the average ratio of TV subscriptions to
access lines from the cable operator data to the actual number of actual lines
supplied by the fixed link operators.  Doing this allowed the TV output figure in
these firms to vary over time and with the size of the firm.  The results did not
however change significantly so the constant TV output figure of 0.00001 was
maintained for the fixed operators in the sample.
As an additional consideration with regard to the combined dataset, it was thought
that the newness of the cable operators in the market (resulting in the early yearsNatural or Unnatural Monopolies in U.K. Telecommunications?
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technologies, this is an interesting result and by increasing the size of the panel
in which BT can be embedded, further augments our ability to obtain better
estimates for BT.  Mobile operators, in contrast, can not be included in this
combined function
15.  This conclusion should perhaps not be unexpected
especially given the differences in technologies and the regulatory development
of this sector
16,17.
Table 5.1 presents the results of the econometric estimation of the combined
translog cost function for cable and fixed link operators
18.  Of the 66
                                                                                                                                                              
of service in large investments and few customers) might give rise to problems of
lumpy investment.  To try to take account of this, the age of the system –
recommended by Nick Oulton – was included as an extra variable in the
estimation process.  As discussed above (footnote 11), it was not however included
in the final reported cost equation as it did not significantly change the results.  As
another robustness check, inspection of the data was conducted and certain data
points (specifically 8 data points from new start-ups in the first year of service)
were removed.  The estimation was then repeated.  Again, the results did not
change significantly, so the full dataset was maintained in the final estimation.
15. For the mobile operators, there are only 18 observations available for the period
1990 to 1997.  Thus Chow predictive tests were conducted for the fixed link and
mobile operators, and for the cable and mobile operators.  The results showed that
at the 5% level of significance, the hypothesis of stability was rejected and so the
data for  mobile could not be grouped with either the fixed link or cable operator
data.
16. Although there are considerable differences in technology between mobile systems
and fixed and cable systems, new techniques of radio transmission developed for
the radio market have potential fixed link applications and public mobile networks
already established in the market are well positioned to provide fixed and mobile
integrated services.  However, other differences have also arisen from the
regulatory environment and from the historical treatment of the mobile market as
a premium and distinct market from ordinary PSTN rather than as an alternative
to fixed and cable telephony.  This has meant that the cost structure of the mobile
market has not developed as its PSTN equivalent.
17. Details of the separate estimated cost functions for the fixed link and cable
operators can be obtained from the author on request.
18. Checks on the estimated translog cost function were conducted to ensure that it
conformed to economic theory.  As stated above, homogeneity and symmetry
were imposed during the estimation and continuity followed from the functional
form.  Checking for monotonicity and concavity, we found that the estimatedNatural or Unnatural Monopolies in U.K. Telecommunications?
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parameters estimated, 15 are significant at the 1% level, 6 more are significant at
the 5% level and a further 3 parameters are significant at the 10% level.
Furthermore, 60% of the first-order terms for the independent variables in our
model are significant at the 10% level.
Although the output variable estimates will be discussed in more detail in
Section 6, it is worthwhile noting that the estimated parameters for the second-
order output terms are all less than one and of mixed signs.  This contrasts
significantly with the results derived by Evans and Heckman (1983) and
                                                                                                                                                              
translog cost function was monotonic with respect to input prices for most years.
In the case of concavity, 97 observations (62%) are concave in factor prices.  We
also checked for negative marginal costs.  In this case, only 10% had positive
marginal costs for all outputs.  Analysing this further, it was found that 51% of
local marginal costs, 54% of national and international marginal costs
(predominantly in operators using BT for national indirect access), 1% of access
marginal costs and 23% of TV marginal costs (mainly in non cable operators) were
negative.  The negativity in marginal costs was predominantly present therefore
for local and national calls.  On the basis that subsidisation of local and access costs
has been encouraged for political and social reasons and is thus being picked up by
the results, checks were thus conducted to ascertain whether total marginal costs
for all outputs were positive.  In this instance, 99% of the observations had positive
marginal costs.  A further check was also carried out by estimating an
unconstrained total cost function.  Again similar results were obtained.
These problems of not meeting regularity conditions for estimated cost functions
are common in these exercises.  A number of studies (Fuss and Waverman, 2002,
Röller 1990a, b) identify problems with the translog function as a flexible
approximation.  In particular, it has proven difficult for U.S. and Canada to obtain
well-behaved multiple-output telecommunications cost function estimates with
positive cost elasticities.   The main reason being because of the very flexible
nature of the translog functional form.  As a consequence, positive marginal costs
at the mean were imposed on our model (see Jorgenson, 2000; Diewert and Wales,
1987; Fuss and McFadden, 1978; Lau, 1978; Terrell, 1996; Ryan and Wales, 2000;
and Salvanes and Tjøtta, 1998).  This improved concavity to 84% and marginal
costs for local, national and international and access all became positive.  The
problem with the estimates of this function are however that they result in the
total cost equation having an R
2 of zero.  It appears therefore that the use of this
data is not ideal and so caution needs to be observed in any inference.  However,
given that this is the only data available, one has no choice than to work within
the context of this existing data limitation and as an exercise for the UK market, it
contributes to the sparse UK literature in this area.Natural or Unnatural Monopolies in U.K. Telecommunications?
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Charnes, Cooper and Sueyoshi (1988) who obtained implausibly large values in
the range of 5 to 10.  This meant that a 1% increase in an output could cause,
according to their results, a very large increase or decrease in output cost
elasticity.  Comparing our estimates with those obtained by Shin and Ying
(1992), suggests that although our results are higher than their estimates, they
are nonetheless in the right range.  Part of the reason why we would expect our
estimates to be different is because we are analysing a sample of firms that
covers substitute telecommunications systems such as cable and mobile
networks.  One could also argue that the underlying production function of the
U.K. telecommunications industry is different from the Shin and Ying study of
the U.S. as the firms used in their analysis were more comparable.
Generally the signs of the output interaction terms appear to be consistent with
industry expectations.  In particular, the interaction term for access lines and
local call minutes is negative and significant which confirms the
telecommunications economic argument that these two services are
interdependent.  The closeness between these two services, specifically with
regard to the network components used, thus means that considerable cost
savings may be made in producing these two services in tandem.  The
interaction term of access lines and TV subscriptions is also negative and
significant.  This is to be expected given the network architecture of cable
operators in producing TV and access.  The interaction term of access lines
with national and international call minutes is, in contrast, positive and
significant, as per industry expectations, indicating that these two services
appear not to be characterised by economies of scope.  With regard to the other
interaction terms: local and national and international, local and TV and TV
and national and
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Table 5.1        Translog Cost Function Estimation Results From Combined Fixed And Cable Dataset
Equation Standard Error Of Regression R-Square
Total Cost 0.22096 0.997764
Labour Share 0.16270 0.292502
Capital Share 0.11803 0.769395
Standard Standard
Error Error
Intercept -0.69496 0.88690 PK.TV -0.00616 0.00707
PL 0.24423 * 0.04918 PK.DE 0.00151 0.00329
PK 0.33823 * 0.03680 PK.CAP 0.01380 **** 0.01027
A 0.93327 * 0.09814 PK.DEN -0.01155 * 0.00253
LO -0.316564 ** 0.14574 PK.T 0.01380 *** 0.00770
NAIN 0.17876 *** 0.09740 A.LO -0.04797 * 0.00990
TV 0.09459 0.63541 A.NAIN 0.03359 * 0.00858
DE 0.06760 0.05720 A.TV -0.08162 ** 0.03946
CAP -0.12969 0.91943 A.DE 0.06130 * 0.01539
DEN 0.07666 ** 0.02967 A.CAP 0.11532 *** 0.05813
T 0.06945 0.33212 A.DEN 0.00203 0.00778
1/2 PL
2 0.04636 * 0.00506 A.T -0.00595 0.01921
1/2 PK
2 0.12870 * 0.00408 LO.NAIN 0.00834 1.43649
1/2 A
2 0.03970 ** 0.01776 LO.TV 0.07606 ** 0.03765
1/2 LO
2 0.02387 * 0.00234 LO.DE 0.00666 0.01295
1/2 NAIN
2 -0.028578 ** 0.01123 LO.CAP -0.11551 ** 0.05451
1/2 TV
2 0.07219 ** 0.02847 LO.DEN -0.028792 * 0.00562
1/2 DE
2 0.05936 * 0.01394 LO.T 0.08063 * 0.02995
1/2 CAP
2 0.11282 0.20394 NAIN.TV -0.01671 0.03918
1/2 DEN
2 0.02924 * 0.00498 NAIN.DE 0.00898 0.01428
1/2 T
2 -0.03472 0.07908 NAIN.CAP 0.02698 0.05616
PL.PK -0.018351 * 0.00347 NAIN.DEN 0.00542 0.00555
PL.A -0.047823 * 0.00606 NAIN.T -0.045498 ** 0.02023
PL.LO -0.00429 0.00470 TV.DE -0.04842 0.04985
PL.NAIN 0.01869 * 0.00490 TV.CAP -0.08914 0.07178
PL.TV 0.02404 ** 0.00958 TV.DEN -0.030221 * 0.00931
PL.DE -0.00733 *** 0.00422 TV.T -0.00224 0.01394
PL.CAP -0.03782 * 0.01415 DE.CAP 0.08320 0.07490
PL.DEN 0.01503 * 0.00332 DE.DEN -0.066546 * 0.00910
PL.T -0.02695 * 0.01022 DE.T 0.01224 ** 0.00562
PK.A 0.02125 * 0.00435 CAP.DEN 0.04049 * 0.01299
PK.LO 0.00449 0.00361 CAP.T 0.00579 0.02078
PK.NAIN -0.01108 * 0.00366 DEN.T -0.013827 * 0.00504
Definitions:PL=Labourprice,PK=CapitalPrice,A=Accesslines, LO=Localcalls, NAIN=National& InternationalCalls,
TV=TV Subscription Numbers, DE=% Digital Exchanges, CAP=Cable TV Channel Capacity, DEN=Customers Per
Kilometre Squared, T=Peterson Index of Productivity
* indicatessignificanceat the 1% level,**indicatessignificanceat the 5% level,***indicatessignificanceat the 10% level
and **** indicates significance at the 20% level.
All variables are in natural logs. The period of estimation covers 1990 - 1997 and 26 local infrastructure operators are
analysed in the unbalanced panel
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international, the results appeared to contradict the standard view but most
were insignificant
,19.
The input prices estimates or factor shares at the sample mean are all positive
and appear to be of appropriate magnitudes.  The labour, capital and other
input shares are 0.21, 0.356 and 0.433 respectively.  The interaction terms with
time reveal a tendency for labour shares to decrease and capital input and other
shares to increase over time.  This pattern of increased capital usage should not
be unexpected, given the sample period under analysis.  Furthermore, it appears
to mirror the results in Correa (2003) which showed that over 1991 to 1996,
capital usage increased - perhaps in response to the infrastructure policy in place
at the time - and labour usage decreased – because perhaps with increased
numbers of firms competing in the market, it was necessary for firms to
become more cost-effective (see Haskel and Szymanski, 1993).
Turning now to the percentage of digital exchanges variable (DE) and the cable
operator channel capacity variable (CAP), the results are mixed.  In the case of
the latter variable: cable operator channel capacity, the results show that the
first-order term is negative but insignificant.  Computing the CAP cost
                                                          
19. Given the non-positive parameter estimate value for local call minutes, further
robustness checks were conducted.  In particular, the estimation was re-done
excluding the parameters involving local call minutes.  Under this scenario, the
parameters for national and international call minutes and TV subscriptions now
became non-positive but insignificant.  Additionally removing the parameters
involving national and international call minutes and TV subscriptions meant that
the first-order access line term remained positive.  Conducting a F-test on these
restrictions showed that they could not be rejected.  It suggests therefore that there
is a strong correlation between the outputs.  This is not surprising given the
network components used to produce these services.  Analysing the estimates from
the translog cost function comprising access lines only, shows that 0% of the
observations are now concave, 93% are monotonic in input prices and 99% have
positive marginal costs.  This implies therefore that in this function, flexibility and
concavity are working in opposite directions.  This is not something new and in
fact has been observed by many other economists doing these types of exercises
(see footnote 18).Natural or Unnatural Monopolies in U.K. Telecommunications?
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elasticity at sample averages (see Table A.I.1 in Annex I) shows that this
remains negative but insignificant.  This weakly confirms therefore the
argument that as the channel capacity of cable operators increases, costs decline.
For the DE variable, the parameter estimate at sample averages is positive (see
Table I.1 in Annex I) but insignificant from zero.  This suggests therefore that
costs are not generally affected by this variable.  Digital and electronic
technologies offer many advantages.  They increase network capability and
reduce the cost of capacity and access.  Thus as more exchanges are converted,
costs should, according to expectations, decline.  The results from the
combined dataset do not however show this
20.
The customer density variable (DEN) has a small positive and significant first-
order term and a small positive and significant squared term
21.  This contradicts
the standard concept of economies of density as it implies that more
customers/access lines per kilometre squared will actually result in an increase
in cost.  Reviewing, however the interaction terms with DEN shows that as
customer density increases, the price impact of capital decreases – this
observation appears to be consistent in the separate cost function estimations as
well.   The interaction term of DEN with access lines is positive but very small
and insignificant
22, whilst the interaction terms of DEN with local call minutes
and TV subscriptions are negative and significant.  This shows therefore that
via the interaction terms, the density argument is weakly supported.
                                                          
20. The DE cost elasticity for the fixed operators estimation is significantly negative.
This implies therefore that cost savings can be enjoyed as exchanges are converted
for fixed link operators.
21. Furthermore, computing the DEN cost elasticity (see Table A.I.1) shows that costs
increase but by a small amount.
22. For the separate estimations, the interaction term of DEN with access for the fixed
link operator cost function is small, positive and significant whilst for the cable
operator cost function, it is small, negative and significant.Natural or Unnatural Monopolies in U.K. Telecommunications?
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Finally looking at technological change (T), the first-order coefficient is positive
but insignificant.  Evaluated at the sample mean, the cost elasticity (see Table
A.I.1) of T is negative and significant.  This thus confirms the positive
productivity growth rate in telecommunications during the period 1991-1996 as
shown by Correa (2003).
6.  Global Subadditivity Of UK Infrastructure Providers
As discussed in Section 1, the determination of whether the set of local loops in
the U.K. is a natural monopoly is essentially an empirical question and to date,
within the U.K., no study has managed to examine this process in detail
23.
Using the translog cost function estimation results from Section 5, we
investigate in this section, the subadditivity of U.K. infrastructure providers’
costs.
A useful starting point in the analysis of the U.K. infrastructure providers’
costs is the examination of scale elasticities (SCE) as discussed in Section 3 (see
Table A.I.2 in Annex I).  At the sample mean, the overall fixed and cable
industry scale elasticity estimate equals 1.028 or the sum of the output cost
elasticities is 0.973.  Testing this estimate for constant returns to scale shows
that this hypothesis cannot be rejected.
Calculating the specific scale elasticity for BT on an annual basis from the
combined fixed link and cable operator dataset shows that BT on average (over
the eight-year period) has a SCE of 1.033 which is insignificant from constant
returns to scale.  This is quite a strong result, especially given the tighter
bounds of the test arising from the BT data being embedded in a much richer
                                                          
23. As discussed in Section 2, the Hunt and Lynk (1990) study estimated a long run
cost function and concluded from the estimate of scale economies that BT was
locally subadditive.  This, however, was not explicitly tested.  Therefore, Hunt and
Lynk’s conclusion from their study must be interpreted with caution.Natural or Unnatural Monopolies in U.K. Telecommunications?
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panel so that more robust estimates are obtained.  Comparing the results
obtained for BT with the estimates derived by Hunt and Lynk (1990), one can
observe differences.  In particular, Hunt and Lynk’s study seemed to show that
BT had very strong scale economies although they did not report any
significant tests.  This divergence in the results should not be unanticipated as
the present study, unlike Hunt and Lynk’s, considers a post-duopoly industry
that is multi-firm and multi-technology.  It appears therefore that the two
studies are suggesting different stories with our results on economies of scale for
BT suggesting that infrastructure competition may be a reasonable policy.  This
however need not be true.  The fact that the industry being analysed is a multi-
output market means that economies of scale are neither necessary nor
sufficient for natural monopoly status (see Sharkey, 1982).  As a consequence,
in order to investigate whether the local loop in the U.K. is a natural
monopoly, more thorough subadditivity tests need to be conducted on our
sample of firms.  In particular, we need to consider whether BT’s outputs
(comprising access lines, local calls and national and international calls) can be
divided more efficiently amongst new firms in the marketplace.
An industry is said to be naturally monopolistic if it is not possible to reduce
total costs by dividing monopoly output between more than one firm.  More
formally, this means that for a firm to be a natural monopoly, its cost function
must be strictly and globally subadditive over the relevant range of output.
Subadditivity requires that the cost of producing the monopoly output, 
m q , be
strictly less than the costs of any n  vector of outputs summing to 
m q .  In
general, n is typically limited to the case of two firms,  β α   and  
24.  Given this, a
test of subadditivity involves checking for:
                                                          
24. The particular two firm configuration is determined by weights.  This is discussed
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Evans and Heckman in their 1983 paper proposed a local test for subadditivity.
What this meant was that the hypothetical outputs of the two firms were
required to be no less than the minimum of the data and had to lie within the
sample range of ratios
25.  Given that they used only 30 yearly observations, the
requirement to restrict their test was necessary for reasons of practicality.
However, because the dataset used in this study is much larger and of a wider
range, the test for subadditivity, given by equation (5), where each vector
consists of three outputs  )   ,   , ( 3 2 1 q q q , where  i q  refers to access, local, national
and international calls
26, could be considered to be more global like that
conducted by Shin and Ying (1992).
To generate the hypothetical output vectors:
                                                                                                                                                              
divided between the firms.  If  ) ( ) ( ) (
m q C q C q C > +
β α  for any values of the weights,
then monopoly provision of 
m q is not cost minimising.  This condition is stringent.
25. In particular, this meant that the hypothetical outputs of the two firms had to lie
within a sample range of ratios which are equal to RL=Min(Q1t/Q2t) and
RU=Max(Q1t/Q2t) where Q1 and Q2 are the separate outputs of the firms.
26. The subadditivity test in this paper does not include TV subscriptions because the
main focus of this thesis is on telecommunications and not broadcasting issues.
However, given the increasing convergence of telecommunications, broadcasting
and IT, the inclusion of TV subscriptions would be a useful extension of this
exercise.Natural or Unnatural Monopolies in U.K. Telecommunications?
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where the scalars 
m m m q q q 3 2 1   and     ,   and   .9) 0.3,.....0   0.2,   0.1, (   and     , = θ ϖ π  are the
monopoly outputs relating to access, local, national and international calls.
This results in 729 output vector combinations for each observation.  It should
be noted that the scalar vector excludes zero and thus means that firms  β α   and  
do not produce zero outputs where the translog cost function would not be
defined
27.
Dividing BT’s outputs between two firms in our sample, the costs of the 729
hypothetical vector pairs are compared to the BT cost arising from the
provision of those outputs. In computing these divisions, there are many
alternative or additional
approaches.  In the following analysis, two specific approaches are considered:
(i)  apportioning BT’s outputs amongst any two firms who have costs and
characteristics corresponding to the firms in our sample i.e. fixed and
cable operators.  This involves a large number of combinations of each
and every firm.  For example, BT’s outputs could be distributed
                                                          
27. The fact that the two hypothetical firms do not produce zero outputs means that
the subadditivity tests conducted here are tests of necessary conditions for natural
monopoly. In the words of Evans and Heckman, (1983 pp36) ‘Rejection of that
hypothesis is informative.  Acceptance within a region… is not informative’.  All
that acceptance demonstrates is that there are inefficient ways in dividing output
between more than one firm.  Failure to reject the necessary condition for natural
monopoly does not imply that the incumbent operator is a natural monopoly.  To
perform such a test requires extrapolation of the cost function well outside the
range of the data used to estimate it.Natural or Unnatural Monopolies in U.K. Telecommunications?
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amongst a fixed link and cable operator or two fixed link operators or
two cable operators; and
(ii) dividing BT’s outputs amongst two firms who are assumed to have the
same costs and operating features as BT.
6.1.1.  Subadditivity Analysis For (i): Dividing BT Outputs Amongst Fixed
and Cable Operators
Processing the data by year, to avoid memory problems, gives Table 6.1.  Since
we use an unbalanced data panel, the second column sets out the number of
possible two-firm output combinations considered each year.  The figures
presented in the third and fourth columns of the table show the frequency and
percentage of cases where monopoly costs are lower than the sum of the two-
firm costs as in equation (5) above.  The remaining four columns show the
savings from having a monopoly.  The savings are computed as:
) ( )) ( )] ( ) ( .([ 100
m m q C q C q C q C − +
β α (7)
where positive values indicate subadditivity and negative values indicate
superadditivity.
Table 6.1 shows that the general results are similar over the years.
Consequently, the detailed discussion of the summary test statistics focuses
only on the most recent year in the sample, 1997.  Analysing the summary
statistics in Table 6.1, one can observe that in 1997, if monopoly outputs were
divided between two firms, then inNatural or Unnatural Monopolies in U.K. Telecommunications?
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18% of the possible vector combinations, society could benefit from lower
costs
28.
Now if these percentages were derived from the ‘true’ cost function then
particularly since they come from plausible divisions of structure, they would
indicate the potential for cost savings.  However, since they are obtained from
an estimated cost function, the statistical properties of the function must be
considered – see footnote 29.
Table 6.1 shows the minimum, maximum and average percentage differences
between the monopoly and the two-firm costs, where positive values indicate
that the monopoly costs are lower.  The minimum percentage difference, in
Table 6.1 is negative in all cases.  Two firms sharing the monopoly output in
1997 could have possibly lowered costs by a minimum percentage of 4.2% or
raised costs by 12% - see discussion about statistical properties of these estimates
below.
                                                          
28. Additional tests were carried out on the robustness of the results obtained here.  In
particular, subadditivity tests were performed for various scenarios: (i) BT was
excluded from the data, (ii) other companies were iteratively left out of the data,
and (iii) BT data (using the translog results above) was analysed only.  For all
scenarios, the minimum percentage difference remained negative.  Now because of
the statistical properties issue discussed below, it is unclear whether subadditivity
or superadditivity prevails.  Either way the percentage differences are small so it is
probable that the normal benefits from competition: allocative, productive and
dynamic will outweigh such small potential efficiency losses. Table 6.2 presents the
subadditivity results from examining BT.  The results of the other scenarios are
not presented in this paper.  In addition to the checks above, subadditivity tests
were furthermore carried out on the translog cost estimates derived from the
dataset where certain data points were removed (to take account of start-up issues)
and also on the cost estimates from the fixed link translog cost function.  Again the
tests seemed to show that the minimum percentage difference remained negative
but small.  Once more, indicating potential gains from introducing competition
into the local loop.  Details of the subadditivity tests for the fixed link estimation
can be obtained from the author on request.Natural or Unnatural Monopolies in U.K. Telecommunications?
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The seventh column in Table 6.1 shows the average percentage savings from
having a monopoly.  The results for 1997 show that on average, two firms
sharing industry output might raise production costs by 1.08%.  This suggests
therefore that there are inefficient ways of dividing output and that ‘inefficient
entry’ may occur.  Now, it can be argued that specific operators
“uneconomically duplicating” network should be prevented, as it is
“inefficient” entry into the marketplace.  Prevention of “inefficient” entry can
only be defended, however, if it can be proved that this is to the detriment of
the consumer in the long run.  Inefficient companies can only impose a cost on
the consumer if they are not allowed to fail when they should.  Provided this is
allowable, the only loser from an "inefficient" entry is the investor, who should
be quite capable of making a judgement on market entry without assistance.
The condition where the minimum percentage difference is negative is
therefore stringent in that it implies that there is a potential for cost savings.  It
should be noted, however, that there is no guarantee that these cost savings or
optimal splits will materialise especially given strategic oligopoly behaviour by
firms in the marketplace.  Furthermore whilst the conventionally calculated
standard errors (the last column of Table 6.1) appear to demonstrate that all the
percentage differences are strongly different from zero, they are likely to be
biased estimates of the true standard errors
29.  In any case the absolute
magnitudes are small and so it is probable that the normal benefits from
competition i.e. innovation will exceed such small potential losses of efficiency.
The summary results for 1990 to 1996 further support the results from above.
At best, in 1995, 91% of the vector combinations produces lower single-firm
                                                          
29. The standard errors have been calculated using the formula: 
n
x σ .  However, this
is only valid if the standard errors are computed from statistically independent cost
functions.  Given that they have been derived from the same cost function, it
means that caution must be observed in any inference.Natural or Unnatural Monopolies in U.K. Telecommunications?
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costs.  The minimum percentage difference is constantly negative and on the
basis of conventionally calculated standard errors, significantly different from
zero. Depending on the extent of the bias in those standard errors the results
therefore again suggest that industry and economy gains could potentially be
made from introducing competition in the local loop
N Percent Minimum Maximum Average Std.  Error
35,733       62.84 -2.06 2.61 0.69 0.0049
48,169       72.61 -1.64 9.04 1.62 0.0102
55,407       72.38 -2.00 10.00 1.41 0.0097
105,574     69.29 -3.34 9.53 1.15 0.0056
129,547     76.93 -4.56 10.82 1.54 0.0060
218,634     91.16 -2.42 11.34 1.62 0.0045
235,275     90.91 -2.40 13.18 1.46 0.0049
212,454     82.09 -4.18 11.96 1.08 0.0047
Table 6.1               Subadditivity Summary Results By Year For Fixed/Cable Operator 















6.1.2.  Subadditivity Analysis For (i):Dividing BT Outputs Amongst Fixed
and Cable Operators With Positive Marginal Costs Imposed
Checking whether the above results are robust to Röller’s (1990) criticism
30, the
marginal costs of the three outputs were computed for each hypothetical vector
combination.  If any of the three marginal costs were negative, then that
observation was deleted from the analysis
31,32.
                                                          
30. Röller (1990) criticised Evan and Heckman’s (1983, 1984, 1986, 1988) results
because he said that if the test region was constrained to exhibit positive marginal
costs, the Evans and Heckman results were reversed so that they did not reject the
natural monopoly hypothesis.
31. As discussed above, in Section 5, it has proven difficult for our data to obtain well-
behaved multiple-output telecommunications cost function estimates with positive
cost elasticities.  It is possible therefore that the use of this data is not ideal and so
caution needs to be observed in any inference.
32. It is worthwhile noting that access and national and international cost elasticities
are generally positive whilst the local marginal costs are predominantly negative.Natural or Unnatural Monopolies in U.K. Telecommunications?
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Table 6.2        Subadditivity Summary Results With Positive Marginal Costs By Year For Fixed/Cable
N Percent Minimum Maximum Average Std.  Error
631          92.66 -0.32 1.72 0.93 0.0228
810          87.38 -0.54 1.42 0.64 0.0152
2,881       89.75 -0.77 1.60 0.71 0.0089
23,965      95.52 -0.93 10.61 1.34 0.0049
16,745      93.34 -0.71 10.58 0.92 0.0069
52,544      98.50 -0.88 2.35 1.03 0.0025
49,156      97.26 -0.77 2.42 0.91 0.0028
34,120      99.34 -1.05 2.69 1.40 0.0031











Than Two-Firm Costs Percentage Savings From Having a Monopoly
Possible
Table 6.2 presents the results from this procedure.  It shows that imposing
positive marginal costs reduces the number of possible configurations by a
considerable amount.  This should not be too surprising given the difficulties
encountered in obtaining cost function estimates with positive cost elasticities.
                                                                                                                                                              
This is due to the non-positive parameter estimate value for local call minutes and
might be because of the strong correlation between the outputs as shown by
robustness checks on the estimation (see footnote 21).  For this reason,
subadditivity tests were carried out on the estimation comprising access lines only
and also on the cost estimation with positive marginal costs imposed.  The results
in both instances show that the minimum percentage difference is consistently
negative.  Thus it suggests again that gains may be made by having competition in
the local loop.
On the basis that marginal costs may be partly distorted by cross-subsidisation,
checks were conducted to ascertain whether total marginal costs for all outputs
were positive.  In this instance, all observations had positive marginal total costs.
Given this, if cross-subsidisation is the reason for these results then Table 6.1
rather than Table 6.2 would be valid.  However, because we cannot be entirely
sure, we must be cautious in interpreting the data.
In the case of national and international calls, negative marginal costs appear
usually only to be present in combinations with Atlantic Telecom.  A possible
reason for this is because this firm during the sample period generally provided a
low level of national and international service.  Given this, it is understandable
that negative marginal costs have been observed.Natural or Unnatural Monopolies in U.K. Telecommunications?
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The greatest reduction is in 1990 of 98.8% and the least decrease of 77.7%
occurs in 1995
33.
Despite this considerable decrease in possible configurations, Table 6.2 shows
however that the constraint of positive marginal costs still generally confirms
the results of Table 6.1.  Although the percentage where a single firm is more
cost effective increases, the minimum percentage difference remains
consistently negative.  Now because of the statistical properties issue discussed
previously, it is unclear whether subadditivity or superadditivity prevails.
Either way the percentage differences are small so it is probable that the normal
benefits from competition: allocative, productive and dynamic will outweigh
such small potential efficiency losses.  Therefore, incorporating Röller’s (1990)
criticism in our analysis, serves only to confirm the results of Table 6.1.
6.2.1.  Subadditivity Analysis For (ii): Dividing BT Outputs Amongst Firms
with BT Characteristics
As discussed previously, subadditivity tests were also conducted just on BT
34 so
as to provide a check against the Hunt and Lynk study mentioned previously.
Table 6.3 outlines the summary statistics for BT.  Even taking account of the
fact that these estimates are obtained from the derived cost function, Table 6.3
                                                          
33. This considerable reduction in the number of possible configurations is worrying –
this may in part relate to the accounting procedures of firms in the market.  The
suggestion that parts of the system have been unduly extrapolated was also
examined.  In particular, the hypothetical outputs of the two firms were checked
to ensure that they lay within the sample range of ratios (as per Evans and
Heckman, 1983 – see footnote 25) and that they were no less than the minimum of
the data.  The results of this comparison show that the data in this study is much
larger and of a wider range.  Thus the subadditivity tests conducted here could be
considered to be more global like the tests conducted by Shin and Ying (1992).
34. As discussed above, robustness checks were conducted on the subadditivity tests.
One of those checks analysing BT data (using the translog cost function estimates
from Section 5) is presented here.  As another check, however, we also analysed
the BT data for the translog cost estimates derived from the dataset where certain
data points were removed (to take account of start-up issues).  The results again
showed that the minimum percentage difference is negative.Natural or Unnatural Monopolies in U.K. Telecommunications?
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shows that in 1997, of the 729 possible configurations, 332, or only 46%, result
in a single firm being able to produce at a lower cost than two firms.
Analysing the minimum, maximum and average summary statistics reveals that
the minimum percentage difference is negative in all cases.  Two firms sharing
the 1997 BT monopoly output can possibly lower costs by a minimum
percentage of 0.3% or raise costs by 0.4%.  These differences are small and so it
is probable that the normal benefits from competition i.e. innovation will
exceed such small potential losses of efficiency.  In terms of the average
percentage savings from having a monopoly, the results suggest that for 1997,
the monopoly saving is small but positive.  This differs however for most other
years.  In particular, the results for 1991 to 1996 seem to show that
Year N Percent Minimum Maximum Average Std.  Error
1990 364 49.93 -0.134 0.188 0.010 0.0019
1991 252 34.57 -0.131 0.152 -0.005 0.0017
1992 166 22.77 -0.119 0.109 -0.018 0.0014
1993 204 27.98 -0.152 0.163 -0.014 0.0019
1994 128 17.56 -0.136 0.107 -0.030 0.0015
1995 102 13.99 -0.136 0.096 -0.035 0.0014
1996 14 1.92 -0.125 0.069 -0.043 0.0012
1997 332 45.54 -0.260 0.388 0.017 0.0039
Than Two-Firm Costs Percentage Savings From Having a Monopoly
Monopoly Costs Lower
Table 6.3     Subadditivity Summary Results By Year For BT Arising From The 
Combined Fixed and Cable Cost Function Estimation
on average small cost savings could have been made by dividing output amongst
two firms.  This analysis for BT suggests therefore that there might be gains
from introducing competition in the local loop.
6.2.2.  Subadditivity Analysis For (ii): Dividing BT Outputs Amongst Firms
With BT Characteristics With Positive Marginal Costs ImposedNatural or Unnatural Monopolies in U.K. Telecommunications?
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Checks were also conducted on the BT subadditivity tests with respect to
Röller’s criticism.  Table 6.4 presents the results from this analysis.  It shows
that only in 1995 and 1996 were there data points which exhibited positive
marginal costs for all outputs.  This means that for the other years, no real
inference can be made.  This should not be surprising given the discussion in
Section 5 regarding the non-positive parameter estimate value for local call
minutes.  Despite this, however, the results in 1995 and 1996 for BT’s costs
continue to support the view expressed in the previous paragraph.  Conducting
further robustness checks, in particular, subadditivity tests on the estimation
comprising access lines only and also on the cost estimation with positive
marginal costs imposed showed that the minimum percentage difference is
consistently negative for BT.  Even though the percentage differences remain
consistently small, the natural monopoly hypothesis may not be valid.
Table 6.4        Subadditivity Summary Results For BT With Positive Marginal Costs By Year Arising From 
N Percent Minimum Maximum Average Std.  Error
-- - - --
-- - - --
-- - - --
-- - - --
-- - - --
12 27.27 -0.11 0.03 -0.03 0.0058
2 2.17 -0.12 0.07 -0.04 0.0040
-- - - --









Percentage Savings From H aving a Monopoly
Possible
Year Cases
M onopoly  Costs Lower
Than Two-Firm Costs
7.  Conclusions
It has been conjectured by many industry economists that the Commission’s
policy of open network provision and unbundled local loop networks rests on
the premise that the local loop is a natural monopoly and thereforeNatural or Unnatural Monopolies in U.K. Telecommunications?
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competition in the local loop harms efficiency by duplicating fixed costs
resulting in a reduced exploitation of economies of scale and scope. Although,
the question of whether the telecommunications system is a natural monopoly
has been the subject of numerous studies, it has never been fully resolved and
the empirical results have not been consistent.  Furthermore, studies on the
U.K. telecommunications industry have only focused on the pre-privatisation
period.  There is therefore much scope for additional analysis of this issue
within the U.K. market.
Using unbalanced panel data and techniques not previously used in the UK
literature, we have, in this paper, focused our analysis on infrastructure
providers in the U.K.-comprising fixed link and cable operators - and have tried
to examine the extent to which the overall cost function of the U.K.
telecommunications industry is subadditive.
By using a model similar to that adopted by Shin and Ying, (1992) the analysis
in this paper uses unbalanced panel data instead of time-series data from the
U.K. telecommunications sector for 26 (local) infrastructure providers for the
period 1990 to 1997.  This ensures that more degrees of freedom are present in
the exercise compared to other UK research in this area and so more robust
estimates may be obtained for BT.  In contrast, however, to the Shin and Ying
study, this paper focuses on not only same technology firms but also on
substitute telecommunications systems.
In analysing firms with different systems and characteristics, it is reasonable to
assume that their production technologies may differ.  Consequently, separate
cost functions for these systems were estimated and residuals were examined by
type of infrastructure.  Analysis showed that it is reasonable to group the cableNatural or Unnatural Monopolies in U.K. Telecommunications?
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and fixed link operators together into one cost function.  This is an interesting
result and increases the advantages of embedding the BT data in a larger panel.
Estimating a translog cost function for the combined dataset, we found that the
overall fixed and cable industry scale elasticity suggested constant returns to
scale at the sample mean.  Computing the scale elasticity at BT averages also
showed that constant returns to scale might characterise the company.  Given
the tighter bounds of this test i.e. lower standard errors, this is a strong result.
The fact that the industry being analysed is a multi-output market means
however that economies of scale are neither necessary nor sufficient for natural
monopoly status.  As a consequence, more thorough subadditivity tests were
conducted on our sample of firms.
Conducting subadditivity tests:
(i)  apportioning BT’s outputs amongst any two firms who have costs and
characteristics corresponding to the firms in our sample; and
(ii) dividing BT’s outputs amongst two firms who are assumed to have the
same costs and operating features as BT.
showed that the estimated minimum percentage difference, although small, are
consistently negative.  Even if these potential cost savings were not considered
to be statistically convincing, at the very least, they suggest that any potential
losses are very small and thus would be outweighed by the normal benefits of
competition i.e. innovation.  Furthermore, deleting vector combinations where
marginal cost schedules are negative, did not contradict this conclusion.
Taken at face value, the public policy implications of these results could be
significant.  Firstly, they appear to support the infrastructure competitionNatural or Unnatural Monopolies in U.K. Telecommunications?
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policy that has been implemented in the U.K. since 1990.  Secondly, they
suggest that although specific operators may uneconomically duplicate network
costs, this does not appear to have a significant impact on the total industry
cost position so industry and economy gains may be made from introducing
competition in the local loop.  Thus although the result need to be treated
cautiously, they do suggest that the local loop in the U.K. may not be a natural
monopoly and that allowing/encouraging infrastructure competition in the
local loop may result in cost savings.Annex I
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ANNEX I
Additional Analysis For Combined Fixed & Cable Cost Function
The data definitions used in this paper are given in Table A.I.1.  Employment,
wages and capital data are all derived from company accounts.  Wage data is
calculated as wage cost divided by employment.  Capital was measured by
depreciation charges, interest on capital and interest on working capital where
for the latter two charges, the same cost of capital was utilised.  All data is in
current cost terms.
Table A.4.III.1 Data Definitions
Table A.I.1          Data Definitions
TC Total Cost
PL Compensation per employee
PK Capital expenses per access line
PO Residual expenses per access line
A Access lines
LO Local call minutes
NAIN National & International calls
TV Basic TV Subscriptions
DEN Customers/Access Lines per Km
2
CAP Channel Capacity
DE Percentage of Digital Exchanges
Cost Standard T-
Elasticities Error Statistic
Scale Elasticity 1.02878 0.623649 1.64962
Output Cost Elasticity 0.972022 0.589241 1.64962
Capacity Cost Elasticity -0.12576 0.843654 -0.149067
Digital Cost Elasticity 0.073915 0.053837 1.37295
Density Cost Elasticity 0.05704 0.013795 4.13492
Productivity Cost Elasticity -0.06589 0.030074 -2.19095
Table A.I.2
Cost Elasticities For The Combined Fixed And Cable Cost Function EstimationAnnex I
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Table A.I.2 outlines the cost elasticities calculated from the results presented in
Table 5.1.  A discussion of these estimates is provided in Section 5Bibliography
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